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Abstract
In a large system, XML documents associated with it
can be large and complicated. To manage access con-
trol in such a large and complicated system is very
difficult. Recently, Access Policy Sheet (APS) [6] was
introduced to provide a solution to access control for
large XML systems. In this paper, we proposed a tem-
poral access control scheme in APS where the propa-
gation of authorization rights is assumed. The autho-
rization policies can be automatically revoked when
the associated time expires. We also provide conflict
resolutions for our temporal authorization system.
Keywords: XML, Access control, Temporal authoriza-
tion
1 Introduction
XML has been widely applied to manage Internet in-
formation. An XML document system could be very
large and complicated and its security protection could
be also very difficult. Protecting such an XML system
requires a sound access control mechanism, which pro-
vides formalisms for specifying, analyzing and evalu-
ating security policies that determine how an access
right is granted and delegated among particular users.
Recently, researchers [2, 3, 4] have become in-
creasingly interested in developing authorization mod-
els which are flexible and expressive enough so as to
handle the specification and enforcement of multiple
policies. [1, 5, 9] have provided some ideas develop-
ing XML authorization models which are flexible and
expressive enough for handling the specification and
enforcement of multiple policies. However, those mod-
els are very complicated and difficult to realize. In
our previous work, Access Policy Sheet (APS) [6], has
been introduced. This model provides a simple and
dynamic scheme for XML authorization management.
However, temporal authorization [8] and authorization
propagation have still not been investigated in XML
based access control systems including APS. In this pa-
per, we present some new properties in APS including
temporal authorization, conflict resolutions and the
time dependency which can handle temporal access
control policies and policy propagation. In our model,
the authorization can be automatically revoked when
the associated time expires. By the hierarchical rela-
tionships along with the partial orders defined in APS,
we also provide a mechanism for conflict resolutions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Sections 2,3 and 4, we describe the basic definitions
of our model including those of APS. In Section 5, we
present the XML Temporal Delegation Authorization.
In Section 6, we discuss the conflict resolution. In
Section 7, we investigate the conflict resolution while
the authorization propagation is assumed. In Section
8, we conclude this paper.
2 Definitions of the vocabularies
in DTD
In this section, we define our access control model.
We give the definitions of DTD, APS, and associated
system components including subjects, objects, autho-
rization rights, and types.
2.0.1 Subject
A subject is active. It could be a user or a processor. A
subject has a name and other associated information
dependent on the application. We require subjects to
be either ordered with a proper order or unordered
when the order of subjects are insignificant.
Subject Set. Subject constant poset (S, >):
admin, s1, s2, · · · , sn denote ordered subjects with the
order of admin > s1 > s2 > · · · > sn. We assume that
the administrator possesses the highest privilege.
A subject can be defined according to the need.
For example, a subject could be described by set of
attributes such as name, address, rights, etc. As the










Objects are passive. They could be files, programs, ta-
bles, etc. Objects are represented by a constant poset
(O,>): o1, o2, · · · with the order o1 > o2, > ... The
object is described as target + path(V, E), where
target is an XML document or URL address, path
is an XPath expression that eventually selects specific
portions (object) of the XML document in the XML
tree where V is a set of nodes and E is a set of edges.




<!ELEMENT target href #PCDATA>
<!ELEMENT path #PCDATA>
]>
In our XML access control model, the object are
the nodes of the DOM tree. We allow the objects
are ordered.The order of object is given by tree
inheritance relation.
2.0.3 Access Rights
The order of access right is given by a priority hierar-
chy relation. In our model, we define the object with
the access right of write will automatically have the
access right of read, so we have the partial order: read
> write. That is, if a user has a write right on an
object, then he will have a read right on it as well.
Ordered rights are defined as a constant poset (A,
>): a1, a2, · · · with the order: a1 > a2 > ... For exam-
ple, Read > Write > Executable. They are defined
in DTD as follows.
<!DOCTYPE access_right[
<!ELEMENT access_right (a*) #IMPLIED>
]>
2.0.4 Authorization Type






Authorization type is given by the constant
set T = {+,−, ∗}, where + specifies grant w.r.t.
an access right, − is the negation w.r.t. an access
right, and ∗ specifies “delegable” w.r.t. an access right.
3 Predicates
In this section, we give the definitions of the predicates
of grant, delegate and cangrant for describing the
delgatable authorizations.
Definition 1 (grant ) grant is a 5 -tuple predicate
|S| × |O| × |T | × |A| × |S| .
grant(s,o,t,a,g) : grantee s is granted by grantor g
the access right a on object o with authorization type
t. We can use XML to define the structure of rule
Grant In the delegation process, the entity that has
been given the access right to delegate by another en-
tity, who has the access right, can perform valid delega-
tions. The following is the definition of our delegable
rules. Predicate grant in XML is an authorization
rule, where the element grant with attributes grantee;






where +,-,* denote allow, deny, and delegable, re-
spectively.
access_right ∈ {r, w,...},
status ∈{true, false}
Definition 2 (cangrant) cangrant (s,o,a): subject s
has the right to grant access a on object o to other
subjects.
cangrant is a 3-tuple predicate |S| × |O| × |A|,
where S is a set of subjects which is a grantor or
a grantee; O = target + path(V, E), target is an
XML or URL, path is an XPath expression that even-
tually selects specific portions (object) of the XML doc-
ument in XML tree where V is a set of nodes and E
is a set of edges; A is the set of access rights. Here,
subject ∈ S,
target+path ∈ O,
access_right ∈ {read, write,a1,a2,...}
status ∈{true, false}
Definition 3 (delegate) Delegate is a 4-tuple pred-
icate :|S| × |S| × |O| × |A| rule, where S is a set of
subjects which is a grantor or a grantee; O = target
+ path(V, E), target is an XML or DTD, path is an
XPath expression that eventually selects specific por-
tions (object) of the XML document in XML tree where
V is a set of nodes and E is a set of edges; A is the




access_right ∈ {read, write,a1,a2,...},
2
status ∈{true, false}
delegate(g,s,o,a): subject g has directly or indi-
rectly granted subject s access a on object o with dele-
gable type.
4 Authorization Rules in APS
Directly using XML to describe access control often
shows little advantage when the access control sys-
tem is complicated (e.g., when authorization delega-
tion and propagation are required). In our model, au-
thorization specifications or rules are provided in an
Authorization Policy Sheet (APS) associated with the
document/DTD. In APS, the representation of autho-
rizations is described in terms of orders of the objects
and subjects and explicit authorization rules.
The APS is separate from the document and DTD
and offers great convenience in the administration of
access control for system administrators due to its sim-
plicity. The system administrator can manage the sys-
tem access control by the concise rules given in an
APS. The resultant XML sheet can be generated from
the corresponding DTD and APS. APS also shows the
great advantage due to its convenience in the specifica-
tion of explicit rights and the implicit rights for XML
documents.
The partial orders of the access control components,
including subjects, object, types, and rights, are one
of the key components in an APS. We will see that
they can be used to simplify our access control system
by implicit rules in authorization propagations.
The following figure of the XML DOM tree expresses




Figure 1: DOM tree, where each node represents an
object.
Now let’s see how to to determine the orders of the
objects. According to the structure of the DOM tree.
In our model, the root node has the greatest order
in any order chain. We can describe the hierarchy
relation as following: o1 is the root of the tree, o2
and o3 are the descendant nodes of o1, o4 and o5 are
the children nodes of o2 and the grandchildren nodes
of o1, o6 is the child node of o3 and the grandchild
nodes of o1,
So, we have o1 > o2 > o4, o1 > o3 > o6, and o1
> o2 > o5.
To provide fine grained specification in XML, we
utilize the XPath expression to identify the structure
of the tree. An Xpath expressions on an XML doc-
ument tree is a sequence of element name or prede-
fined functions separated by the character: for the one
branch of the tree: o1-o2-o4, node o4 can be expressed
as /o1/o2/o4/ and we have the partial order: /o1/
>/o1/o2/ >/o1/o2/o4/.
In general, we have the object partial order
chain: /root/ > /root/ child of root/ > ... >
/root/child of root/grandchild of root/.../.
For example:
//hospital/ > //hospital/room-info/ >
//hospital/room-info/patient/.
Thus, the order of the ancestor nodes in a DOM
tree are always greater than the order of the descen-
dant nodes.
An APS sheet consists of a finite set of rules and
orders. A rule consists of name, head and attribute.
When the head of a rule is an authorization predicate,
the rule is called authorization rule. For a set of rules
named r, each rule consists of a predicate and an at-
tribute:
<p, attribute> <- <condition>
Here, p1, p2,...,pn are a set of predicates and
attribute denotes the components associated with
the predicate. condition denotes the condition with
respect to the rule of a predicate. Due to the space
limit, we will omit the details in this paper and will
present it in the full version of the paper.




<!ELEMENT predicate (grant, cangrant )
#IMPLIED>
<!ELEMENT condition (gran, cangrant)*>
]>
5 Syntax of Temporal Autho-
rizations
Access Policy Sheet (APS) allows an administrator
to manage the rules separated from XML documents
and DTD. APS consists of a finite set of rules. R =
{r1, r2, ...., rn}, A rule consists of a set of predicates
and conditions associated with the predicates. r =
(P, C), where P = {p1, p2, ...., pn} denotes a set
of predicates and C denotes a set of conditions. We
describe a rule in APS as,
<p, attributes> <- <coditions>
where p is a predicate of arity n in P.
3
Temporal authorizations enforce a rule to have
tenable validity. Formally, we add a time interval ∆i
to a rule, e.g., ri = (P, C)(∆i), where ri is the tempo-
ral rule which has a temporal argument ∆i defined as
∆i = (si, ei) . si is the start time and ei is the end
time.











This rule is applied to predicate grant, condition
cangrant and the validity period of the authoriza-
tion which contains the start time and the end time.
Grantee Alice has the access right read and write
on the Xpath specified object hospital info.xml,
with the Xpath //Star Hospital/operation info.
Grantor Bob has the authorization to grant read on
the all files of the same directory to others. The valid-
ity period of the rule is 09/10/05-11/10/05.
According to the structure defined in the associ-
ated DTD (omitted), the authorization will be able to











































Since both positive and negative authorizations can
co-exist in our system, conflict resolution among rules
must be considered. Also, since we allow implicit au-
thorization (authorization via authorization propaga-
tion), implicit conflicts make the problem more com-
plicated. The policy of “the most specific subject(or
object) takes precedence” which is proposed by E.
Bertino [1] cannot be adapted to our model. In fact,
according to the inherence hierarchy relation in the
partial order chain, we can get the policy of the “the
least specific takes precedence”. The basic idea of solv-
ing conflicts is outlined as follows.
6.1 General Rules
Using delegation relation. According to the delega-
tion relation, if subject s delegates subject s’ directly
or indirectly an authorization on object o and access
right a, then, when a conflict w.r.t o and a occurs, the
authorization from s (i.e. s is the grantor) will always
override the one from s’.
From authorization type inheritance. For two
conflicting authorizations w.r.t. a subject, an object,
and an access right, according to the inheritance hier-
archy of authorization type − > + > ∗, the authoriza-
tion with a lower partial order will override the one
with a higher type order.
From subject inheritance. For two conflicting au-
thorizations w.r.t. an object, a right, and an autho-
rization type, according to the inheritance hierarchy
of subjects, if s> s’, then the authorization w.r.t. s
will override the inherited one with s’.
From object inheritance. For two conflicting au-
thorizations w.r.t. a right, a grantor, and a grantee,
we consider the object inheritance relation. According
to the inheritance hierarchy of objects, if o > o’, then
the authorization on o will override the inherited one
on o’.
From access right inheritance. For two conflict-
ing authorizations w.r.t. a grantor, a grantee, and an
object, according to the inheritance hierarchy of ac-
cess rights, if a > a’, then the authorization on a will
4
override the inherited one on a’.
6.2 The Scheme for Temporal Autho-
rizations
According to the definition of temporal authorization
in the preceding section, we denote by ri(∆i) the tem-
poral authorization, where ∆i = (si, ei) is the validity
period of rule ri, si is the start time, and ei is the end
time. Our conflict resolution is twofold: resolution
without the time factor (given in the preceding sec-
tion) and resolution with the consideration of the time
factor. For example, for two conflict authorizations
ri(∆i) and rj(∆j), we consider the conflict resolution
of the ri and rj omitting the time factor first, using the
methods we discussed in the preceding section. Then,
we consider the time factors ∆i and ∆j . We denote
by φ the time overlap of two temporal authorizations,
i.e., φ = ∆i ∩∆j , by ⇒ an override operator, and by
⇔ a conflict operator.
Suppose we have two rules ri(∆i) ⇔ rj(∆j), where
∆i = (si, ei), ∆j = (sj , ej). If φ 6= 0, we have the
following cases.
When si = sj and ei = ej , then we have
{
ri ⇒ rj : ri(si, ei)
rj ⇒ ri : rj(sj , ej)
which means two conflict authorizations completely
overlap. If ri ⇒ rj , then we have ri(si, ei). If rj ⇒ ri,
then we have rj(sj , ej). The following cases are self-
explanatory; therefore, we omit the explanation.
In the case of si 6= sj , ei = ej , we have
{
ri ⇒ rj : ri(si, ei), rj(sj , si)
rj ⇒ ri : rj(sj , ej)
In the case of si = sj , ei 6= ej , we have
{
ri ⇒ rj : ri(si, ei)
rj ⇒ ri : rj(sj , ej), ri(ej , ei)
In the case of si 6= sj , ei 6= ej , we have
{
ri ⇒ rj : ri(si, ei)
rj ⇒ ri : rj(sj , ej), ri(si, sj), ri(ej , ei)
When si > sj , ei > ej , we have
{
ri ⇒ rj : ri(si, ei), rj(ei, ej)
rj ⇒ ri : ri(si, sj), ri(sj , ej)
If there is no time overlap between two conflict au-
thorizations, then each rule is taken separately without
any influence from the other.
{
ri ⇔ rj
∆i ∩∆j = 0 : ri(∆i), rj(∆j)
7 Conflict Resolution with Au-
thorization Propagation
Authorization propagation is implemented in terms of
the partial order of subjects, objects and access rights.
As defined in [4], we allow the implicit rules derived







Figure 2: Rule propagation in a DOM tree.
Figure 2 shows an XML DOM tree, where object
o1 is the root of the tree, o4 and o2 are the nodes on
one branch of the tree. o4 is the descent node of o2.
According to the partial order rule of the propagation
on the objects we introduced before, there exists a
partial order relation o2 > o4.
Suppose that in APS there are two authorization
rules r4 and r2 actively applied to o4 and o2, respec-
tively. With authorization propagation, r
′
4 is derived
from r4. The authorization rule w.r.t. o2 is then af-
fected by r
′
4. If r4 is in conflict with r2, then r
′
4 is also
in conflict with r2. The conflict resolution discussed
in Section 4.1 is still applicable.
We now discuss it further by considering the time
factor. Suppose that the above authorizations are tem-
poral rules, r4(∆4) and r2(∆2). For o2, r′4(∆4) derived
from r4(∆4) is also applied. Consequently, we have
{
r4(∆4) ⇔ r2(∆2)






∆4 ∩∆2 6= 0 :
{
r′4(∆4) 6⇔ r2(∆2); (no overlap)
r′4(∆4) ⇔ r2(∆2); (overlap)
Here, we give an example. Suppose that in XML
document medical.xml, there are two nodes in the
DOM tree, //hospital/room-info/ and it’s child
node //hospital/room-info/patient/, According




Assume that r1(∆1) and r2(∆2) are two temporal rules










Through the propagation, r′2(∆2) is derived from




Obviously, for the same object
medical.xml+//hospital/room-info/,
r′2(∆2) is in conflict with r1(∆1). ∆1 =
(s1, e1) = (01/04/05, 01/07/05) and ∆2 = (s2, e2) =
(01/06/05, 01/12/05) follow the case, s2 > s1 and
e2 > e1. According to the conflict resolution we ana-
lyzed in section 4.2, r1 will override r′2 in the period
of 01/04/05 to 31/05/05 and r′2 will override r1 in the
period of /01/06/05 to 01/12/05.
8 Conclusion
Access control in XML documents is very complicated
and difficult to manage. Access Policy Sheet (APS)
provide us with a concise methodology to resolve the
problem. In this paper, we proposed a temporal APS
which can handle time related authorizations includ-
ing conflict resolution, authorization delegation, au-
thorization propagation. Based on our previous work
, our new model can be used to satisfy the temporal
requirement for XML authorizations.
This paper presents a compositional formal framework
for the specification of our temporal access control
policies. With a temporal intervals of validity, the au-
thorization would automatically revoked when the as-
sociated temporal interval expires. By the hierarchical
relationships along with the partial orders defined in
APS, we had given the conflict resolutions in several
conditions.
Our contribution makes APS be able to handle more
complicated XML access control systems and our
scheme exhibits significant simplicity to the XML sys-
tem management.
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